This paper studies the effects of labor market policies on R&D activities and unemployment. I develop a search and matching model in which firms' R&D decisions are endogenously determined. The model demonstrates that more intensive labor market policies that protect workers reduce the levels of R&D activities. This study offers a theoretical framework to understand the relationship between R&D activities, labor market policies, and unemployment which is discussed in empirical studies. workers reduce the levels of R&D activities. This study o¤ers a theoretical framework to understand the relationship between R&D activities, labor market policies, and unemployment which is discussed in empirical studies.
Introduction
Over the years, economists have been interested in the relationship between economic growth and unemployment. The simultaneous slowdown of productivity growth and the rise in unemployment in OECD countries in the latter half of the 1970s has led many economists to believe that there is a close connection between these trends. Both theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the in ‡uence of technological progress on unemployment. Recently, several empirical studies demonstrate that labor market policies that a¤ect unemployment, such as a …ring tax, a payroll tax, and an unemployment subsidy, also have e¤ects on technological progress (Nicoletti et al. 2002; OECD, 2002) . However, there have been only a few theoretical studies on the e¤ect of such labor market policies on the R&D activity that is main driving force of technological progress.
Especially, there has been no study on e¤ects of labor market policies on R&D decisions in a search and matching model.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a search and matching model in which R&D decisions
are endogenously determined and to analyze the e¤ect of labor market policies on R&D activities. For this purpose, I incorporate R&D activities into the search and matching model with disembodied technological progress developed by Pissarides (2000) . While the economic growth rate is determined purely exogenously in Pissarides'model, in my model, it is in ‡uenced by the level of R&D activities. That is, the higher the level of R&D activities, the higher the growth rate.
By introducing endogenous R&D decisions into the equilibrium unemployment model of Pissarides (2000), this study is able to explore the e¤ects of various labor market policies on unemployment and the level of R&D activities. I focus on three labor market policies such as a …ring cost, a payroll tax, and an unemployment bene…t. The model demonstrates that these policy interventions to the labor market discourage …rms from opening new jobs, leading to higher unemployment. Furthermore, increases in the …ring cost and the unemployment bene…t reduce the value of having a …lled job, therefore discouraging …rms from investing in R&D. The e¤ect of an increase in the payroll tax on the level of R&D activities is qualitatively ambiguous due to a lower workers'outside option from lower labor market tightness.
This study treats endogenous R&D decisions, which have not been treated in the standard search model of Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (2000) . Chen, Mo, and Wang (2002) also analyze a search economy with R&D activities, but their focus is to construct a model of endogenous growth with labor market frictions and to study …rms'decisions to adopt new technology. Furthermore, none of these papers discusses the e¤ect of labor market policies on R&D activities, which is the main focus of this study.
2
This paper is also related to the literature on growth and unemployment. The search and matching theory predicts that the impact of growth on unemployment depends on the extent to which new technology is embodied in new jobs (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998; Pissarides and Vallanti, 2007) . The matching model with disembodied technological progress predicts that a faster growth rate reduces unemployment through the so called capitalization e¤ect (Pissarides, 2000) . On the other hand, in the model with embodied technological progress, faster growth can increase unemployment through creative destruction Howitt, 1994, 1998; PostelVinay, 2002) . Motivated by the empirical evidence that productivity growth decreases the unemployment rate, Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) demonstrate that totally disembodied technology is necessary for the model to match empirical evidence. In this paper, I follow Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) and assume that technological progress is disembodied. Furthermore, my model pushes their argument one step further, since in my model the rate of economic growth is in ‡u-enced by R&D activities, while the economic growth rate is determined purely exogenously in models of Pissarides (2000) and Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) .
My work is closely related to Mortensen (2005) . Mortensen (2005) develops the Schumpeterian growth model with labor market friction and investigates the e¤ects of labor market policies on growth and unemployment. While technological progress is assumed to be embodied and the creative destruction e¤ect plays an important role in the model of Mortensen (2005) , in my model technological progress is totally disembodied and the capitalization e¤ect plays an important role. Although this study and Mortensen (2005) share the same implication for the e¤ects of labor market policies on unemployment and the innovation level, the underlying mechanisms are di¤erent. While labor market policies a¤ect unemployment and the innovation level through the job creation side in my model, they a¤ect unemployment and innovation through the job destruction side in the model of Mortensen (2005) . Furthermore, the predictions for the relationship between the growth rate and unemployment are di¤erent. My model generates a negative relationship between growth and unemployment, while their relationship is theoretically ambiguous in Mortensen (2005) . These di¤erences come from the assumption of technological progress, whether it is embodied or disembodied.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2.
In Section 3, the steady-state equilibrium of the model is characterized. Section 4 presents comparative statics results. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
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The model
Consider an economy consisting of a continuum of workers normalized to one and a large number of identical risk-neutral …rms. All agents are in…nitely lived and maximize the present discounted value of their income stream with discount rate r. Time is continuous.
A …rm has only one job that can be either …lled or vacant. One job is …lled by one worker. 1 A …rm can produce output if its job is …lled. If it is vacant, the …rm produces no output and searches for a worker. A worker can be either employed or unemployed. If a worker is employed, he produces output and earns an endogenous wage but cannot search for other jobs. If he is not employed, he searches for a job.
Once a …rm and a worker are paired, they separate with the exogenous probability at each time. After a matched …rm-worker pair separates, the …rm leaves the labor market or reopens a new vacant job at ‡ow cost t . The worker enters the unemployment pool and looks for another job.
Production takes place in one …rm-one worker pairs. The match produces a ‡ow of output p t at time t. Suppose that the leading technology in the economy is driven by an exogenous invention process that grows at the rate g. In order to study the e¤ect of R&D activities on technological progress, I assume that the productivity growth rate of a …rm is positively related to the level of R&D investment. Let y be the level of R&D activity. Then, the output of a …rm at time t is given by
where (0) = 1; y > 0, yy < 0, and p 0 > 0 is some initial productivity level which is normalized to be one. 2 To make economic sense, I assume that r is large enough so that r > g (y).
When a …rm with a vacancy meets an unemployed worker and an employment contract is signed, the …rm chooses the level of R&D investment and incurs the cost C t (y). C(y) is the total cost function that is necessary to make y units of investment and satis…es C y > 0 and C yy > 0.
In this paper, I analyze the e¤ects of three policy instruments ; F t ; and Z t that determine payroll taxes, a …ring tax paid by a …rm, and an unemployment subsidy, respectively. In the model, a …rm has to pay payroll taxes. Let represent a proportional payroll tax paid by the …rm. In addition, a …rm has to pay a …ring tax F t when separation takes place. On the other 1 In the standard search and matching model, each …rm hires one worker and can post at most one vacancy (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000) . Pissarides (2000, Ch. 3) considers a model of large …rms in which each …rm can employ many workers. He shows that the model with large …rms has the same implications as the standard model, assuming that wages are determined through bargaining at the individual level.
2 I am grateful to the referee for his/her comments with respect to the treatment of the productivity growth rate.
4 hand, a worker receives an unemployment subsidy Z t when he is unemployed.
The number of successful job matches per unit time is given by the matching function M(u t ; v t ); where u t is the number of unemployed workers and v t is the number of vacancies at time t. The matching function M(u; v) is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, increasing in its arguments, and has constant returns to scale. De…ne t v t =u t as the tightness of the labor market. The rate at which a …rm with a vacancy is matched with a worker is M(
Similarly, the rate at which an unemployed worker is matched with a …rm is m(u t ; v t )=u t = t q( t ):
Since the matching function has constant returns to scale, q( t ) is decreasing in t and t q( t )
is increasing in t . I also make the standard Inada-type assumptions on M(u; v); which ensure
After a …rm with a vacancy and an unemployed worker meet, the …rm produces output and pays wages to its worker. Wages are chosen so as to share the surplus from the job match in …xed
proportions. The worker's share is 2 (0; 1).
The value functions
The values of …rms and workers are described by a series of Bellman equations. I start with the …rm's side. Let the value of a …lled job be J t and the value of a vacant job be V t .
The value of a …lled job satis…es
A …rm with a …lled job revenues p (1 + )w, which is the productive output of the match minus the wage paid to the worker. The match may be destroyed by the exogenous shock at rate , in which case the …rm loses its asset value of the …lled job, pays the …ring tax, and obtains the value of a vacant job. Finally, the asset value of a match is expected to change over time due to technological progress.
Because of the existence of the R&D investment cost, the expected pro…t of a new match is di¤erent from J t , as de…ned in (1). Therefore, I introduce the notation J n t for the expected pro…t of a new match to the …rm. Then, the value of a vacant job at time t is given by
Given the starting wage w n t , the initial value of an …lled job satis…es
I now turn to the worker's side. Let W t denote the value for an employed worker at time t.
It satis…es
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where U is the value of an unemployed worker. The value of an employed worker is determined by several factors. The worker receives the wage w. The match may be destroyed by the exogenous shock at rate , in which case the worker loses the current asset value and obtains the asset value of being unemployed. The asset value of a match is expected to change over time due to technological progress.
The value of an unemployed worker satis…es
where W n is the value of an employed worker at the moment of job creation.
Given an initial wage w n , the initial value of an employed worker satis…es
The …rm that has a job with value J t at time t expects to make a capital gain of dJ t =dt = g (y)J on it. The same holds for the value of an employed worker W t and an unemployed worker U t , where the capital gain is g (y)W and g (y)U , respectively. But the value of a job V t does not change because it is zero by the free entry condition.
I focus on the steady state. This corresponds to a balanced growth path where the economy grows at the rate of productivity growth g (y). To make the mode stationary, I assume that all exogenous variables grow at the rate of productivity growth. 3 Thus, I de…ne three positive exogenous parameters ; z, and F such that t = p t , Z t = p t z, and F t = p t F . Furthermore, the cost function can be rewritten as C t (y) = p t C(y).
Replacing the capital gain by its steady-state value, the above Bellman equations can be rewritten as follows:
and
3 In the literature, in order to ensure the existence of a balanced growth path, usually all the exogenous parameters are assumed to follow the pace of productivity growth. See, for example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) .
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The amount of R&D investment y is chosen by the …rm to maximize the present-discounted value of its expected income at the moment of job creation. Therefore, the optimal level of y
The wages are determined through the Nash bargaining between a …rm and a worker over the share of expected future joint income. I assume that at the initial wage determination stage the cost of R&D is not "sunk" but "on the table". Under this assumption, the di¤erence between the initial wage bargaining and subsequence renegotiation arise. 4 When a …rm and a worker …rst meet and sign a contract, the payo¤ to the …rm equals J n V pC(y) because the …rm incurs R&D costs. Therefore, the initial wage is determined by the following equation
Once the worker is employed, the …rm will not pay the cost of R&D. In this case, however, if the …rm fails to agree to a continuation wage, the …rm will have to pay the …ring cost pF . Thus, the continuing wage is chosen as
The solution to these optimization problems must satisfy the following …rst-order conditions
respectively.
In equilibrium, all pro…t opportunities from new jobs are exploited. Thus, I have the following free entry condition
4 This wage determination mechanism is adopted in most of search and matching models. See Pissairdes (2000, Ch.9) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) . This study assumes that a …rm chooses the level of R&D activity after bargaining the wage with its worker, but there are alterative timings of the R&D investment to be considered.
The reverse timing is one of alternatives. Thus, a …rm meets an unemployment worker and chooses the level of the The evolution of unemployment is given by the di¤erence between the ‡ow into unemployment and the ‡ow out of it. Thus,
In the steady-state, the unemployment rate is determined by
3 Characterization of steady-state equilibrium A steady-state equilibrium is a pro…le {u; ; y; w n ; w; J n ; J; V; W n ; W; U } which satis…es the Bellman equations (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), and (12), the condition for the optimal level of R&D (13), the wage equations (14) and (15), the free entry condition (16) , and the steady-state unemployment rate condition (17) .
The free entry condition (16) together with the equation (8) yields
From (11), (14), (16), and (18), the value of an unemployed worker can be rewritten as
By substituting J n and W n given by equations (9) and (12) into (14) with the free entry condition (16) , I obtain
Substituting the value of unemployment (19) into the above relation, I get an expression for the initial wage
One can derive the continuation wage in a similar manner as I did in obtaining the initial wage. By using equations (7), (10), (15), (16) , and (19), the continuation wage is
By substituting the starting wage (20) into (9) and by imposing the free entry condition V = 0, and by using the equation (18), I obtain
This equation is referred as the job creation condition. The job creation condition (21) states that the expected vacancy cost, the left-hand side of (21), equals to the …rm's share of the expected net surplus from a new job match, the right-hand side of (21).
Finally, using the equations (9), (16) , and (20), the optimal condition for the R&D level (13) can be expressed as,
which can be summarized as
The left-hand side of equation (23) is the marginal bene…t of investment in R&D. I denote this term by B(y). Equation (23) states that in the equilibrium the optimal level of R&D activities is such that the marginal bene…t of investment in R&D is equal to the marginal cost of it.
The second order condition for the determination of the optimal R&D level is given by
which implies
The system of equations (21) and (23) determine the endogenous variables and y. Given , equation (17) determines the steady-state equilibrium unemployment rate.
The e¤ects of labor market policies
In this section, I analyze the e¤ects of labor market policies on unemployment and R&D activities.
The model has three labor market policy parameters: the …ring tax F , the payroll tax , and the unemployment subsidy z. I perform comparative static exercise by totally di¤erentiating (17) , (21) , and (23) with respect to endogenous variables and exogenous policy parameters. In
Appendix, I present the formal derivation of the comparative statics results.
I begin by analyzing the e¤ects of the employment protection on unemployment and R&D activities.
Proposition 1 An increase in the …ring cost F reduces both the level of R&D activities y and labor market tightness : dy=dF < 0 and d =dF < 0. Then, the unemployment rate increases:
Since the …rm has to pay the …ring tax when the job is destroyed, an increase in the …ring tax reduces the value of a …lled job. The lower value of a …lled job discourages a …rm to invest in R&D. Furthermore, …rms are discouraged to open vacancies. Thus, labor market tightness decreases, leading to higher unemployment.
[ Figure 1 around here]
[ Figure 2 around here]
This result is consistent with recent cross country experience. In Figure 1 and Figure 2 , R&D intensities and average unemployment rates are plotted against the OECD overall employment protection legislation (EPL) index. 5 The correlation coe¢ cient between R&D intensity and EPL Proposition 2 An increase in the payroll tax rate reduces labor market tightness and increases the unemployment rate u: d =d < 0 and du=d > 0. However, the sign of the e¤ ect on the level of R&D activities is ambiguous.
Since a higher payroll tax decreases the pro…t of a …rm, the expected value of a …lled job also decreases. The lower expected value of a …lled job reduces job creation. This leads to lower labor market tightness, resulting in higher unemployment. The e¤ect of the payroll tax on the level of R&D activities is ambiguous. This ambiguity is due to a lower workers'outside option from lower labor market tightness. Since a higher payroll tax reduces labor market tightness, employed workers have worse outside opportunities and so accept lower wages. This increases the value of a …lled job, and …rms are encouraged to invest in R&D activities. However, a higher payroll tax directly reduces the value of a …lled job, discouraging …rms from investing in R&D activities. Since the overall e¤ect of the payroll tax on the level of R&D activities is determined by these two opposite e¤ects, it is qualitatively ambiguous. 5 The speci…c countries and the data associated with each are reported in Appendix.
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[ Figure 3 around here]
[ Figure 4 around here]
Similar to the case of the …ring tax, scatter diagram of R&D intensities and unemployment rates against the tax wedge is reported in Figure 3 and 4, respectively. 6 Figure 3 shows that the correlation between R&D intensities and the tax wedge is essentially zero, while Figure 4 shows that the correlation between unemployment rates and the tax wedge is positively correlated, which is consistent with the implication of the model. I now turn to examine the e¤ects of the unemployment subsidy on unemployment and the level of R&D activities.
Proposition 3 An increase in the unemployment insurance bene…ts z reduces the level of R&D activities y and labor market tightness : dy=dz < 0 and d =dz < 0. Then, the unemployment rate u increases: du=dz > 0.
The e¤ects of the unemployment subsidy on the level of R&D activities and labor market outcome are basically the same as the case in the …ring tax. The higher unemployment subsidy increases the worker's wage and thus reduces the expected value of a …lled job. This leads to the lower level of R&D activities and lower labor market tightness, resulting in higher unemployment.
[ Figure 5 around here]
[ Figure 6 around here] R&D intensities and average unemployment rates are plotted against the OECD summary measure of unemployment bene…ts in Figure 5 and 6. Figure 5 shows that R&D intensities and unemployment bene…ts are negatively correlated. This result is consistent with the prediction of the model. In contrast, Figure 6 shows that the correlation between unemployment rates and 6 I use the tax wedge estimated by the Eurostat.
unemployment bene…ts is essentially zero, which is not consistent with the model. However, the impact of unemployment bene…ts on the rate of unemployment has been controversial in the empirical literature (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; Holmlund, 1998) . Furthermore, cross country comparisons of these kind constitutes the most naïve evidence. Therefore, more evidence would be necessary to conclude the e¤ect of the generosity of unemployment bene…ts on the unemployment rate.
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 suggest that labor market policies that protect workers have an important role in determining the level of R&D activities. Thus, the model provides an explanation of the relationship between R&D activities and labor market policies which is reported by several empirical studies.
Lastly, I examine the e¤ect of a change in the technological progress rate g on R&D intensity
and unemployment.
Proposition 4 An increase in the technological growth rate g increases both the level of R&D activities y and labor market tightness :dy=dg > 0 and d =dg > 0. Then, the unemployment rate u decreases: du=dg < 0. 
Conclusion
Recently, several empirical studies demonstrate that labor market policies a¤ect R&D activities.
However, there has not been much theoretical investigation into the e¤ects of labor market policies on R&D activities. This paper develops a search and matching model in which a …rm's R&D decision is endogenously determined. I analyze the e¤ects of labor market policies, such as a …ring tax, a payroll tax, and an unemployment subsidy, on R&D activity and unemployment.
The model demonstrates that these policy interventions to the labor market discourage …rms from opening new jobs, leading to higher unemployment. Furthermore, increases in the …ring cost and the unemployment bene…t reduce the value of having a …lled job, therefore discouraging …rms from investing in R&D. The e¤ect of an increase in the payroll tax on the level of R&D activities is qualitatively ambiguous due to a lower workers' outside option from lower labor market tightness. 
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Proof of Proposition 1
By totally di¤erentiating equations (21) and (23) with respect to endogenous variables and the exogenous variables F , I obtain 0
where the determinant for the left hand side coe¢ cient matrix is given by
Then, the comparative static result can be stated as
The e¤ect on the unemployment rate can be obtained by totally di¤erentiating equation (17) and using above results. Thus, I have
Proof of Proposition 2
By totally di¤erentiating equations (21) and (23) with respect to endogenous variables and the exogenous variables , I obtain
In the above relation, the …rst term of bracket in RHS is negative and the second term is positive.
Therefore, the e¤ect on the level of R&D intensity is ambiguous. Again, the e¤ect on the unemployment rate can be obtained by totally di¤erentiating equation (17) and using above results. Thus,
Proof of Proposition 3
By totally di¤erentiating equations (21) and (23) with respect to endogenous variables and the exogenous variables z, I obtain 0
where the determinant for the left hand side coe¢ cient matrix is given by = q 0 ( ) q( ) 2 +
(1 + ) (r + g (y)) (1 + ) (B y C yy ) < 0:
Then, the comparative static result can be stated as The e¤ect on the unemployment rate can be obtained by totally di¤erentiating equation (17) 
Proof of Proposition 4
By totally di¤erentiating equations (21) and (23) where the determinant for the left hand side coe¢ cient matrix is given by
Then, the comparative static result can be stated as 
